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WINNER, BEST APPELLATE BRIEF IN THE 1995
NATIVE AMERICAN LAW STUDENT ASSOCIATION
MOOT COURT COMPETITION
Daniel L. Cheyette & Andrew J. Bobzien*

Questions Presented
I. Under the common-law test for tribal status or under 25 C.F.R. § 83,
do the LaPaz people have tribal status or acknowledgment so as to qualify
for the benefits and privileges that the federal government provides to such
tribes?
II. Did the Supreme Court wrongly decide Employment Division, Dept.
of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), and wrongly depart
from using strict scrutiny when a generally applicable law significantly
burdens the free exercise of religion?
III. Whether the exemption in 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 for the Native
American Church from federal law prohibiting peyote use, and the entirety
of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994 violate
the Establishment Clause?
IV. Whether the exemption in 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 for the Native
American Church from federal law prohibiting peyote use, and the entirety
of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994 violate
the Due Process Clause and its equal protection component?
V. Does Roberto Ernesto Gonzalez qualify under the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1990 because he is an "Indian"
practicing an "Indian religion?"
Statement of the Case
L Facts
The LaPaz Indian Tribe (LaPaz) is an indigenous group that has resided
in North America for over two hundred years. The La Paz have maintained
a common culture and religion that both binds its people together and
distinguishes them from others. Due to religious persecution, the LaPaz fled
their original homeland and eventually, in the early 1900's, settled in
Rancho Pacifica, New Arizona. Most members of the LaPaz religion live
in Rancho Pacifica, and almost all residents of Rancho Pacifica are

* Daniel L Cheyette: Third-year law student, Northwestern School of Law, Lewis & Clark
College. Andrew J.Bobzien: Law clerk, Native American Program, Oregon Legal Services. Fifthyear evening division law student, Northwestern School of Law, Lewis & Clark College.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1995

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20

members of the religion. The practices and beliefs of the religion are
inextricably intertwined with the LaPaz's culture and politics.
The LaPaz religion incorporates practices that may be related to AfricanCaribbean religions as well as other beliefs and practices borrowed from
Indian tribes of the southwestern United States and norther Mexico. Among
these latter beliefs and practices is the use of peyote in religious
ceremonies. The La Paz religion maintains its world headquarters in Rancho
Pacifice and also owns and operates a private religious school, where a
large majority of its members send their children.
La Paz ancestors were primarily of Indian descent from different Native
tribes which were, and in some cases still are, located in Mexico. However,
because of the understandable lack of formal record keeping, an infusion of
Spanish blood, and the LaPaz's coerced migration, the precise blood
quantum of LaPaz members is extremely difficult to trace.
Roberto Ernesto Gonzalez is both a resident of Rancho Pacifica and a
high priest of the LaPaz religion. On October 15, 1992, Gonzalez was
conducting a religious ceremony at the religion's world headquarters in
Rancho Pacifica. Suspecting that peyote was being used, the FBI witnessed
Gonzalez use peyote, interrupted the ceremony and arrested Gonzalez for
violating the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-996, § 812(c) (1990) (Controlled Substances Act).
IL ProceduralPosture
In 1980, 1988 and 1992, the LaPaz Tribe petitioned for federal
recognition pursuant to 25 C.F.R. § 83 (1994). In each instance, the
Department of the Interior rejected the petition. As a result, the LaPaz Tribe
brought suit against the Secretary of the Interior in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia. That Court rejected the LaPaz
claim, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed. The LaPaz are now before this Court
on appeal.
Gonzalez, in a separate case, was convicted of violating the Controlled
Substances Act. At that trial, and on appeal, Gonzalez has contended that
Employment Division, Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
(1990) (Smith I) was wrongly decided, and therefore, his conviction should
be overturned because it violates the Free Exercise Clause of the United
States Constitution. Gonzalez also protests that the Native American Church
(NAC) exemption, found in 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (1985), from the
prescription of peyote as a controlled substance, as well as the entirety of
the American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994, 42
U.S.C. § 1996 (1994), violate the Establishment Clause and the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, including its equal protection component.
Nevertheless, Gonzalez was convicted in the United States District Court for
the District of New Arizona, and the Twelfth Circuit affirmed. Gonzalez is
now before this Court on appeal.
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The Supreme Court has consolidated all of the above issues for briefing
and oral argument.
Summary of the Argument
The LaPaz people are a tribe because they satisfy both the common-law
and the statutory definitions of a "tribe." They satisfy the common-law
definition because they meet the Native Village of Tyonek v. Puckett, 957
F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1992), tribal status test. They satisfy the statutory
definition because the historical-ethnic facts of their existence weigh heavily
in favor of tribal status. Moreover, contemporary case-law favors a liberal
definition of the term "tribe." Therefore, the failure of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA) to recognize the LaPaz as a tribe is arbitrary and capricious.
Because the Smith H case was wrongly decided, Gonzalez's conviction
violates the First Amendment of the Constitution. In Smith H, the Court
departed from well established precedent, misinterpreted other cases and
should therefore be overruled. In addition, the Supreme Court abdicated its
duty to protect minority religious practices. Under the compelling interest
test, Gonzalez's religious practice was significantly burdened while the
United States government had no compelling interest to inhibit Gonzalez's
use of peyote under the Controlled Substances Act. Since the government
cannot meet its burden, Gonzalez's conviction must be overturned.
Furthermore, the exemption in the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)
regulation for the Native American Church and the entirety of the American
Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments (AIRFRA) violate the
Establishment Clause because the government endorses the Church and
excessively entangles itself with that religion.
The exemption allowing the Native American Church to use peyote
solely for nondrug, religious purposes and the entirety of the AIRFA
Amendments violate the Due Process Clause because they deny religious
rights according to racial distinctions. The NAC exemption and the AIRFA
Amendments do not give similar treatment to similarly situated people.
In the alternative, Gonzalez can not be guilty of violating the Controlled
Substance Act because he is an "Indian" practicing "Indian religion" and
thus falls under the AIRFA Amendment's peyote exemption.
L The Lapaz People Are a "Tribe"
Federal "recognition" or "acknowledgment" of Native American people
as an "Indian tribe" is crucial to the tribe because it establishes a
government-to-government relationship between the tribal government and
the United States and entitles the tribe to benefits and privileges provided
exclusively to Indian tribes. William W. Quinn, Jr., Federal
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Acknowledgment of American Indian Tribes: Authority, Judicial
Interposition, and 25 C.F.R. § 83, 17 Am. Indian L. Rev. 37, 37 (1992).,
A. The LaPaz People Are a Tribe Because They Satisfy the Traditional
Common-Law Definition of a Tribe
An Indian community constitutes a tribe if it is either (1) acknowledged
as such by the federal government; or (2) if it satisfies the common-law
definition of a "tribe." Native Village of Tyonek v. Puckett, 957 F.2d 631,
635 (9th Cir. 1992). According to the common law test, a "tribe" is: 1) a
body of Indians of the same or a similar race; 2) united in a community
under one leadership or government; 3) inhabiting a particular though illdefined territory; and 4) is the modern-day successor of a historical
sovereign entity that exercised minimal functions of governance. Tyonek,
957 F.2d at 6352, (citing Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266
(1901)).
The LaPaz community is a tribe because it satisfies the common law test.
The recent decision Native Village of Venetie, I.R.A. Council v. State, No.
F86-0075 Civ. (HRH), F87-0051 Civ. (HRH), 1994 WL 730887, at *1 (D.
Alaska Dec. 23, 1994), demonstrates a successful application of the four
part common law test as defined in Tyonek.3 The court viewing
anthropological and historical evidence concluded that the Neets'aii Gwich'in
people (who comprise the Venetie community) were a separate and distinct
race of American Indians because they descended from common ancestors
who resided in villages in the region. Id. The LaPaz people are similar in
that they too are the descendants of native tribes that resided in a single
region, and today remain racially distinct from the people of the surrounding
regions. For these reasons, La Paz are of a distinct race. Opposing counsel
will contest this comparison claiming that recent infusions of Spanish blood
into the LaPaz community distinguish it. Venetie makes clear, however, that
some intermarriage is allowable where the community remains cohesive. Id.
Despite the Spanish infusion, the LaPaz people are cohesive in that they
have remained a tightly-knit community and have retained their unique
culture and religion.

1. See also Rachael Paschal, The Imprimaturof Recognition: American Indian Tribes and
the FederalAcknowledgment Process,66 WAsH. L. REv. 209,212-13 (1991). Recognition gives
the tribe sovereignty over their own territories including the rights to self-government and
sovereign immunity, and is a requirement for receiving federal aid, services and benefits. Peyote
use is one such benefit conferred to tribes. Id.
2. The Tyonek decision fashions this test for tribal status by utilizing the four part Montoya
test and affixing its own fifth criteria. The court concluded the Tyonek Village was a tribe
possessing the privilege of sovereign immunity from suit.
3. Venetie used the common-law test because the tribe was never federally recognized. In
this case, tribal recognition gained full faith and credit for native court decisions from the state
and federal government.
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The LaPaz community satisfies the second criteria of the common-law
test in that it is a united community under single leadership. The Tyonek
court suggested "Political cohesiveness" as evidence of this criteria. Tyonek,
957 F.2d at 635. In Venetie, this criteria was satisfied because the Neets'aii
lived in separate but inter-related bands governed by strong chiefs. Venetie,
1994 WL 730887, at *1. Similarly, the LaPaz people live almost entirely
within the tight-knit community of Rancho Pacifica and the majority are
members of the LaPaz religion which has its headquarters in that
community. Furthermore, the religion operates schools that are attended by
the children of almost every member and otherwise exerts influence over
the lives of its members. These factors demonstrate the politically and
socially cohesive community required by the common-law test.
The LaPaz people satisfy the third criteria of the common law test
because they inhabit a particular territory. Almost all LaPaz people reside
in Rancho Pacifica. Opposing counsel will contend that this is insufficient
to establish a particular territory because over their history the LaPaz people
have been migratory. This contention must fail, however, because Venetie
illustrates that territories need not have specific boundaries. Id.4
The final common-law criteria requires that a group claiming tribal status
must be the modern day successor to a historical sovereign entity. Tyonek,
957 F.2d at 635.5 The Venetie court interpreted this criteria as requiring
that some defining characteristic of the original tribe persists in the presentday community. Venetie, 1994 WL 730887, at *1. The LaPaz people satisfy
this requirement because they have maintained their own distinct culture and
religion despite contacts with the non-Native world.
The LaPaz people are comprised of one race that is united in community,
leadership and territory, and who are the descendants of a historical
sovereign entity. Therefore, the LaPaz satisfies the traditional common-law
definition of an Indian tribe.
B. The Secretary of the Interior's Decision that the LaPaz People Are
Not an Indian Tribe Is Arbitrary and Capricious
Final agency action regarding the tribal acknowledgment of the LaPaz
people as a "tribe" is reviewable. Indians, 25 C.F.R. § 83 (1994).' On
review, a court must reverse an agency decision if it is, "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."
Administrative Procedure Act §2(A), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1964 & Supp. V

4. Although the Neets'aii people occupied four distinct territories in both Alaska and Canada,
the court determined that they nonetheless satisfied the territory criteria of the test. Venetie, 1994
WL 730887, at *1.
5. The Tyonek court interpreted this requirement liberally requiring that the historical
sovereign exercise only the minimal functions of a governing body.
6. A decision is reviewable as a federal question pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1995

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20

1993). The case-law interpreting this standard requires the court to consider
whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors
and whether there has been a clear error of judgment. Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
Applying this standard to the present case, the Secretary's decision not
to acknowledge the tribal status of the LaPaz people must be reversed. The
LaPaz people have lived for over two hundred years in a tightly-knit
community, are the descendants of Native tribes, have maintained their own
unique religion and culture despite extensive contact with non-Native people
and reside within a particular historical territory. The ethnohistorical facts
relevant to the determination of tribal status weigh heavily in favor of the
LaPaz people. Furthermore, many cases have advocated a liberal definition
of Indian tribe.7 For these reasons, it is an abuse of discretion and an error
of judgment not to acknowledge the LaPaz people as an Indian tribe.
C. Because They Preclude Deserving Tribes of FederalAcknowledgment,
the Regulations Promulgatedat 25 C.F.R. § 83 Are Inadequate
The acknowledgment program administered by the Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA) pursuant to 25 C.F.R. § 83 precludes many unrecognized
tribes from federal recognition. Rachael Paschal, The Imprimatur of
Recognition: American Indian Tribes and the Federal Acknowledgment
Process, 66 Wash. L. Rev. 209, 210 (1991).' Prior to the promulgation of
the rules in 1978, acknowledgment was made on a case-by-case in a ad hoc
fashion. A tribe was considered recognized if the BIA determined that a
historic relationship between the government and the tribe existed and then
decided to perpetuate this relationship. L.R. Weatherhead, What is an
"Indian Tribe"? - The Question of Tribal Existence, 8 Am. Indian L. Rev.
1, 15 (1980).' In 1975, Congress created the American Indian Policy
Review Commission (AIPRC) to investigate the status of the American
Indians. AIPRC recognized that serious flaws existed in the current ad hoc
acknowledgment system and suggested a systematic acknowledgment
procedure. Paschal, supra, at 212. These recommendations led to the BIA's
promulgation of regulations. The goal of these regulations is to set relevant
standards that are clear enough to provide useful standards for decision

7. It is appropriate that the definition of "tribe" remain broad enough to reflect inevitable
changes in the meaning and importance of tribal relations and the wide variations among tribal
groups living in different parts of the country. Venetie, 1994 WL 730887, at *1; see also
Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (lst Cir. 1979).
8. Paschal advocates that Congress should amend the criteria to more accurately reflect
contemporary tribal society, adequately acknowledge tribal petitioners and provide for more
accountability by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Paschal, supra note 1, at 209..
9. Recognition refers to two elements: (I) operative legal facts indicating actual recognition,
ahd (2) a legal status recognizing an obligation to the tribe. R.L. Weatherhead, What is an
"IndianTribe"? - The Question of Tribal Existence, 8 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 15 (1980).
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makers, yet are broad and flexible enough to eschew ethnohistorical fallacy
and the exclusion of tribes that do not fit into preconceived stereotypes.
Weatherhead, supra, at 18, 30.
The C.F.R. regulations fail this essential task. Although Congress has
repeatedly shown an intent to define "tribe" so as to reach the greatest
number of Indians possible. Id. at 21. Regulations led to the
acknowledgment of only eight tribes between 1978 and 1992. Quinn, supra,
at 8. Clearly, more tribes are deserving of federal acknowledgment.
In petitioning for acknowledgment under 25 C.F.R. § 83, the petitioner
carries the burden of proof, and failure to prove even one criteria results in
denial of the application. 25 C.F.R. §§ 83.7, 83.9(j). The BIA interprets the
criteria narrowly and requires extensive documentation to establish each
criteria. Paschal, supra, at 218. This can create an insurmountable barrier
to a number of tribes."0 A less prejudicial and more accurate procedure to
acknowledge Indian tribal status is necessary. The common-law test
elaborated above would be both less prejudicial and more accurate. The
factors the common law test considers are relevant to the determination,
provide workable standards for federal decision-makers and are nonprejudicial to the petitioning tribes who carry the burden of proving tribal
status. Finally, using the common law standard will bring to fruition the
liberal approach to acknowledgment that Congress envisioned following the
AIPRC recommendations. Weatherhead, supra at 22.
I. The Smith Case Was Wrongly Decided and Therefore the Conviction
of Gonzalez for Violating the Controlled Substance Act's Prohibitionof
Peyote Use Violates the Free Exercise Clause
In 1990 a devastating blow was delivered to those whose religious
practices conflict with government laws and regulations. In Employment
Division, Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (Smith
II), the Supreme Court incorrectly focused on the criminality of peyote in
Oregon and held that the First Amendment" does not protect individuals

10. For example, North American Indians did not have writing systems and so all early
documentation must come from non-Indian observers; the use of ill-defined terms and the
inconsistent application of these terms during the acknowledgment adjudication preclude
petitioners' attempts to provide the necessary documentation; no standards exist to indicate the
cumulative levels of documentation necessary to meet the BIA's criteria; and the word "tribe" is
a European construction that is inapplicable to many historic Indian peoples. Paschal,.upranote
1, at 224-26. Difficulties such as these make the procedure of petitioning for tribal
acknowledgment overly burdensome, and as a result, Indians deserving tribal acknowledgment,
such as the LaPaz people, are denied this acknowledgment.
11. The First Amendment provides in relevant part that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibit the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend.
I.
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from generally applicable and neutral laws that inhibit, or even prohibit, the

practice of religion. 2 Smith II, 494 U.S. at 877-882.
In Smith II, the Supreme Court departed from well established precedent,

misinterpreted and mischaracterized other free exercise cases, and abdicated
its responsibility to protect the interests of unpopular and minority religious

practices.
For the foregoing reasons, appellant Gonzalez respectfully requests that
Smith 11 be overruled, and that this court reverse appellants conviction
because it violates the Free Exercise Clause under the compelling interest

test.
A. Smith II Departedfrom Well-Established Precedentin Addition to
Misinterpretingand MischaracterizingPast Cases in the Free Exercise of
Religion Context
Modern free exercise analysis began in 1963 when the Supreme Court
decided Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)." Applying strict scrutiny,
the Court set out the test that dominated free exercise jurisprudence until
Smith II: any government regulation that substantially burdens a sincere
religious practice violates the Free Exercise Clause, unless the government
justifies the burden by a compelling state interest that is the least restrictive
means of achieving that interest. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402.
Subsequent Supreme Court cases continued to apply strict scrutiny to
protect religious practices. However, in Smith II, the Court incorrectly

12. Smith 1I limits First Amendment strict scrutiny to cases where the government singles
out a particular religion and purposely limits the right to practice that group's religion. See
Church cf Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2226 (1993) (government
could not prohibit religiously motivated animal sacrifice when the law was aimed at that
particular religiously motivated conduct). Proving intent to discriminate is next to impossible, as
we discovered when people of color claiming equal protection violations were required to provide
direct proof of a motive to discriminate when the law in question was neutral on it face. See
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976).
13. In the case, it was held that a South Carolina unemployment law that denied benefits to
a Seventh Day Adventist who was fired from her job for refusing to work on Saturday (her
Sabbath), violated her free exercise of religion. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
14. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (reversing conviction under a criminal statute
requiring compulsory education because the statute infringed on the Amish's belief that such
schooling was against their faith and way of life); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment
Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (invalidating denial of unemployment to Jehovah's Witness who
would not transfer to employees munitions department for religious reasons); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (holding that denying unemployment
compensation to an employee who refused to work on her Sabbath violated her free exercise of
religion); and Frazee v. Illinois Dept. of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (reversing the
denial of unemployment benefits to complainant, a Christian who refused to work on Sunday,
even though he was not a member of a sect that precluded Sunday work).
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departed from strict scrutiny analysis, and interpreted subsequent cases
inconsistent with their meaning and application.
1. Sherbert Requires Application of the Compelling Interest Test
Because the Criminality of Oregon's Statute Was Not Relevant to the
State's Ability to Interfere with Smith's Free Exercise of Religion
The Smith Court's analysis relied upon the fact that Oregon did not
exempt Smith from the state law prohibiting the use of peyote. The Supreme
Court indicated that the criminality of peyote in Oregon was relevant to the
analysis under the federal Constitution because in the other unemployment
compensation cases, Sherbert,supra, Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707
(1981), and Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 480 U.S. 142
(1987), "the conduct that gave rise to the termination of employment was
perfectly legal." Oregon v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 670 (1988). This analysis
was incorrect because in Yoder, the Court expanded the scope of the
Sherbert compelling interest test to a criminal law. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 234 (1972). Likewise, the Court ignored McDaniel v. Paty, 435
U.S. 618 (1978), where the Court, applying the compelling interest test,
invalidated a Tennessee law that disqualified ministers from holding the
office of convention delegate. The Supreme Court inappropriately relied on
the criminality factor to distinguish the unemployment cases. Smith,
however, was never charged with violating the state statute prohibiting
peyote use. Moreover, the state had never enforced the statute for peyote use
during religious ceremonies. Smith II, 494 U.S. at 910 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). In addition, the Employment Appeals Board of Oregon did not
rely on the criminal statute when it denied benefits to Smith. Smith 1, 721
P.2d 445, 450 (Or. 1986). More importantly, Oregon's highest court found
the illegality of peyote use to be irrelevant when determining the balance
between the states' interest and Smith's interest in the free exercise of his
religion. Id.
In summary, the fact that Yoder expanded the compelling interest test to
a criminal law and that the criminality of peyote use was irrelevant to the
decision, undermines the Smith II Court's reliance on peyote's illegality to
distinguish Smith II from the employment cases.
2. The Smith Court's Characterizationof Yoder as a "Hybrid" Case, To
DistinguishIt from the Facts of Smith II, Was Ill-founded
While skirting the application of the compelling interest test to the facts
of its own case, the Smith II Court characterized Yoder as a "hybrid" case
that combined free exercise of religion and parenthood rights. Smith II, 494
U.S. at 881. It appears this was done for the sole purpose of distinguishing
Yoder from Smith IL
The majority relied on language in Yoder that could arguably, but
unconvincingly, be interpreted to mean that the parental interest was required
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for the Amish's free exercise claim to succeed. Smith H at 881 n.1 (quoting
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233)..
The majorities "hybrid" theory is refuted by the Yoder Court's
unambiguous language that "compulsory attendance law... carries with it
precisely the kind of objective danger to the free exercise of religion that the
first amendment was designed to prevent." Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218. In
addition, the Yoder Court never once stated that two constitutional interests
must be present for strict scrutiny to apply. If anything, the language in
Yoder conveys that the addition of the parental right simply added weight to
the free exercise analysis but was not necessary to tip the balance in favor
of the Amish. Moreover, the Free Exercise Clause itself cannot be construed
to require a "hybrid" situation. If it does, its usefulness as intended by its
drafters is non-existent.
3. The Smith H Court MisinterpretedPost-Sherbert Case Law To
Justify that the Compelling Interest Test Was Confined to the
Unemployment Cases, and that the Compelling Interest Test Had
Become Useless Outside of that Context
To justify its movement away from strict scrutiny analysis, except in the
unemployment compensation area, the Court in Smith 11 discussed several
cases where the Court refused to use the compelling interest test outside of
that specific area." The Court also examined cases where the challenged
law did not involve unemployment compensation law, and the law was
upheld using strict scrutiny." These lines of reasoning are unconvincing.
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), involved a challenge to a
military regulation that forbid the complainant from wearing his yarmulke (a
Jewish skullcap) indoors. Goldman, at 504. O'Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342
(1987), involved a prison regulation that conflicted with some inmates'
religious service. O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 344-45. O'Lone and Goldman are
distinguishable from Smith 11 because both those cases dealt with situations
where not all constitutional rights were available and there was a need for
discipline and uniformity. See Smith II, 494 U.S. at 899 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986), and Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetary Protective Assoc., 485 U.S. 439 (1988), are also distinguishable
from Smith II. In Bowen, a Native American challenged on religious grounds

15. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass'n, 435 U.S. 439 (1988); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987); Goldman v.
Weinberg, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
16. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437
(1971). The Smith II Court argued that the compelling interest test had failed religious claimants
in non-employment compensation cases, and thus had lost utility outside of the unemployment
context. Smith 1H,494 U.S. at 881. This reasoning is unsound because the validity of a
constitutional test should not be based on a win/loss record.
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the government's use of a social security number to identify his daughter.
Bowen, 476 U.S. at 695. In Lyng, an Indian organization challenged the
building of a road and timber harvesting on federal land that was used by
Indians for religious purposes. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 441-42. Both cases are
distinguishable because the compelling interest test is not applicable to the
way the government conducts its "internal affairs." See Smith II, 494 U.S.
at 899 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
B. The Smith IH Court Abdicated Its Responsibility To Protect Unpopular
and Minority Religious Practices
The Smith II Court defers to the legislatures the duty to protect the
interests of minority religious objectors by making exemptions from
generally applicable laws. 7 Because courts function as defenders against
legislative indifference and abuse, by deferring to legislatures, the Smith II
Court abdicated its constitutional responsibility. This is especially troubling
given the nature of legislatures, where compromise is the rule of thumb and
majority political ideology usually prevails.
The Framers of the Constitution intended the courts to check legislative
abuse and majority rule. The FederalistNo. 51, at 357 (J. Madison) (B.F.
Wright ed. 1961). The Framers also created the courts with the power to
determine what the is law. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176
(1803) (the Court is to review the acts of the legislative and executive
branch). History shows that the Framers were conscious of the inherent
problems of majority controlled law making bodies: The very reason the
colonists came to America was to flee religious persecution, and furthermore,
those colonists were not associated with the majority religious group in
England.
For decades the Court has used the power bestowed upon it to defend the
free exercise rights of minority religious groups. See Thomas, 450 U.S. 707
(1981); Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); and
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). Protecting the minority
religious groups is an integral part of the Supreme Court's duty, and by
rejecting this obligation, the Smith II Court has ignored one of its
fundamental roles in our federal system that prides itself on its record of
respecting human rights.
C. Under The Compelling Interest Test the Conviction of Gonzalez
Violated Free Exercise Clause
As discussed above, the Smith II case should be overruled, and the
compelling interest test should be used to determine that the Controlled

17. The Smith I majority left Smith and those like him with the political process as their
remedy. The Court indicated that placing the burden on those who practice minority religions is
an "unavoidable consequence of democratic government." Smith II, 494 U.S. at 890.
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Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 812(c), violates the Free Exercise Clause. The
compelling interest test provides that laws which substantially burden sincere
religious practices violate the Free Exercise Clause, unless the burden is
justified by a compelling state interest that is the least restrictive means of
achieving that interest. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
In this case, Gonzalez, like Smith, meets the first prong of the test.
Peyote serves as the sacrament and central event in LaPaz religious
ceremonies. Thus prohibiting peyote significantly burdens Gonzalez's
religious practice. The United States, on the other hand, does not have a
compelling interest to preclude its use by Gonzalez. It is well established
that peyote use for religious purposes is not harmful to Indian practitioners,
does not present a drug problem to society, and in fact, is beneficial to those
who use it for bona-fide religious purposes. H.R. Rep. No. 675, 103rd
Cong., 2nd Sess. 4-7 (1994). Because the United States cannot meet this
second prong of the test, Gonzalez's use of peyote is exempt from the federal
drug law, and thus, his conviction must be overturned.
IlI. The Exemption in 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 for the Native American
Church from FederalDrug Law ProhibitingPeyote Use, and the Entirety
of the AIRFA Amendments Violate the Establishment Clause
The proper test to decide whether a law violates the Establishment
Clause, 8 the proper test was set out in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971). Both the DEA regulation, 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31, that exempts the
NAC from the federal drug law prohibiting peyote use,' and the American
Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 1996
(1994) (AIRFA Amendments), violate the Lemon standard and are therefore
unconstitutional.
A. The Lemon StandardPrecludes the Governmentfrom Making Laws
That Convey a Message of Endorsement and that Foster Governmental
Entanglement with Religion
In Lemon the Supreme Court set out the three part test, holding that to
pass Establishment Clause scrutiny, a governmental action must (1) have a
secular purpose, (2) not have a primary effect that either advances or inhibits
religion, and (3) not foster governmental entanglement with religion. Lemon,
403 U.S. at 612-13. A subsequent Supreme Court case altered the Lemon
test by adding to the second prong that the government cannot convey a
"message of endorsement." County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595
(1989). The Lemon Court determined that excessive entanglement under the

18. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment dictates that "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
19. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c).
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third prong of the test occurs when the law or regulation creates a need for
the government regulation and monitoring. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622-23. Both
the DEA regulation and the AIRFA Amendments of 1994 violate the second
and third prong of the Lemon test.
B. Both the DEA Regulation and the AIRFA Amendments Convey an
Endorsement of the NAC, and Promote Excessive Governmental
Entanglement with that Religion
The DEA regulations and the AIRFA Amendments also promote excessive
entanglement with the NAC. The AIRFA Amendments themselves although
protecting the right of NAC members to use peyote for bona fide traditional
ceremonial purposes, contain disclaimers which authorize further regulation
of peyote use in certain circumstances. For example, 42 U.S.C. § 1996a sec.
(b) (2) allows the DEA to impose registration requirements on the cultivation
and distribution of peyote. Section (b)(4) of the same provision allows any
federal department or agency, after "consultation with representatives of
traditional Indian religions," i.e. the NAC, to impose restrictions on the use
of peyote by its personnel. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a sec. (b)(2) and (b)(4). The
entanglement of the federal government in the NAC is further noted in the
legislative history of the AIRFA Amendments. H.R. No. 675, 103d Cong.,
2d Sess. 9 (1994). Finally, Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Smith II, noted
that federal regulations strictly control the availability of peyote for religious
uses. Smith II, 494 U.S. at 916 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In particular,
Justice Blackmun cited 21 U.S.C. §§ 821-823 which require the registration
of all controlled substances and 21 C.F.R. § 137.31 which subjects the NAC
to the registration requirements for peyote. Id. These authorities demonstrate
that the federal government is extensively entangled in the NAC.
The same legislative history supports the proposition that the AIRFA
Amendments also endorse the NAC. Although the AIRFA Amendments do
not specifically mention the NAC in the section that exempts peyote use in
bona fide religious ceremonies, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 see. 3(b)(1), the legislative
history demonstrates that the threatened minority religion and target group
that the Amendments are intended to protect, is the NAC. H.R. No. 675,
supra, at 4-8.
The DEA regulation and the AIRFA Amendments also promote excessive
entanglement with the NAC. See Smith II, 494 U.S. at 916 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (noting the strict regulation of peyote by the federal government);
42 U.S.C. § 1996 sec. (b)(2) and (3) (detailing the regulation of the growing
and distribution of peyote, and the regulation of the use of peyote after
"consultation with representatives of traditional Indian religions," i.e., the
NAG); and H.R. No. 675, supra, at 4, 7, 9 (recognizing the strict regulation
of peyote distribution and use and the ability of agencies to so regulate).
Opposing counsel may argue that Peyote Way Church of God v.
Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1991), precludes a finding of an
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Establishment Clause violation. In that case, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the
DEA exemption did not violate the Establishment Clause because the trust
responsibility precludes the separation of church and state ordinarily required
by the First Amendment. Id. at 1217. However, in upholding the exemption,
the Court noted that the government's singling out of the NAC was
understandable because the NAC was the only Native American organization
of which the government was aware that uses peyote in bona fide religious
ceremonies. Id. This finding ignores the fact that there are other groups, such
as the LaPaz Indians, that use peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies.
Because the LaPaz tribe also uses peyote for religious purposes, the Court's
reasoning is inapposite.'
IV. The Exemption for the Native American Church Found at 21 C.F.R. §
130Z.31 and the Entirety of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act
Amendments of 1994 Violate the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Constitution
The DEA lists peyote as a controlled substance in Schedule I of the
Controlled Substances Act. A special exemption to this listing, however, is
extended to members of the NAC for the "nondrug use of peyote in bona
fide religious ceremonies." Food and Drugs, 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (1985). In
1994, the AIRFA Amendments codified a similar ceremonial use of peyote
exemption for Indians. 42 U.S.C. § 1996.
A. Section 130Z31 Violates the Due Process and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fifth Amendment
The exemption extended to members of the NAC allowing peyote use in
religious ceremonies violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment which guarantees equal protection under the law. U.S. Const.
Amend. V. The regulation creates arbitrary classifications between (a)
members of the NAC and (b) members of other religions who also use
peyote for "bona fide religious ceremonies." 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31. The
former group is exempt from regulation, the latter group is not. The Ninth
Circuit has held that this arbitrary classification can not withstand a
substantive due process attack. Kennedy v. Bureau of Narcotics and
DangerousDrugs,459 F.2d 415, 417 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
959 (1973), reh'g. denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973). That court determined that
since the sole government interest served by regulating peyote is the
protection of health," any distinctions that the government makes between
20. At least three other courts have suggested that governmental protection of Indian
religious practices may violate the Establishment Clause in cases involving sacred sites on public
land. Bandoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 179 (10th Cir. 1980); Inupiat Community v. United
States, 548 F. Supp 182, 189 (D.Alaska 1982); Crow v. Gullett, 541 F. Supp 785, 794 (D.S.C.
1982), ajTd 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983).
21. 21 U.S.C. § 801(2) (The use of controlled substances has "a substantial and detrimental
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different religious groups lack any relationship to the legitimate health
interest that the regulation serves. The health effect of ingesting peyote is
unrelated in any way to the religion of the person ingesting the drug or the
importance of the use of peyote in the religious ceremonies of his church.
Id. Based on these findings, the court ruled that the NAC distinction of 21
C.F.R. § 1307.31 "creates an arbitrary classification that cannot withstand
substantive due process attack." Id. at 417.'
The facts surrounding Gonzalez's arrest are similar to those of the
Kennedy case. Gonzalez is a high priest of the LaPaz religion which uses
peyote in a number of religious rites and ceremonies. Gonzalez was arrested
while conducting a holy-day ceremony on the grounds of the LaPaz religion's
world headquarters. Gonzalez's use of peyote during this ceremony fits into
the exemption at 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 as it was used for a "bona fide
religious ceremony." Because the regulation only applies to members of the
NAC, however, Gonzalez is unprotected by it. This distinction is based on
religion and violates Gonzalez's substantive due process rights. Since the
government's sole interest in promulgating Title 21 is health related and
Gonzalez's health is impacted by the ingestion of peyote as much as that of
any member of the NAC, a regulation that exempts the latter, but not
Gonzalez, violates his substantive due process right to equal protection under
the law as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.
The view that an exemption for the religious use of peyote granted to one
religion must necessarily be open to the legitimate religious use of peyote by
all religions, also finds support in the Congressional Record. When Congress
first debated the proscription of peyote in 1965, Representative Oren Harris
remarked that it was the view of the Food and Drug Administration that a
"bill, even with the peyote exemption.... cannot forbid bona fide religious
use of peyote." 111 Cong. Rec. 15,977 (1965) (statement of Rep. Harris).
On the basis of this and similar congressional comments, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York has held that where
peyote is regarded as a deity, Congress can not restrict the use of peyote for
sacramental purposes to the NAC, but must also extend this exemption to
other bona fide religious organizations. Native American Church of New York
v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 1247, 1247 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).' The LaPaz
religion, which uses peyote for sacramental purposes, is a bona fide religion
and the regulation must provide an exemption for Gonzalez's use of peyote.
Nevertheless, the regulation provides only an exemption to members of the

effect on the health and general welfare of the American people.").
22. See also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371

(1971).
23. The comments of Senator Yarborough, Representative Satterfield and the Commissioner
of the Food and Drug Administration were also relied on. Native American Church, 468 F. Supp.
at 1250-51.
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NAC. A regulation that acts along such an arbitrary classification violates
the equal protection clause.
Opposing counsel will argue on the basis of Peyote Way Church of God
v. Thornburgh that the exemption of the NAC is a political distinction.
Peyote Way Church of God v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1991).'
This allegation is false. The majority of NAC congregations maintain an
"open door" policy that does not exclude persons on the basis of their race.
United States v. Boyll, 774 F. Supp 1333, 1336 (D.N.M. 1991), appeal
dismissed, 968 F.2d 21 (10th Cir. 1992). Racial restrictions to membership
have never been a general part of the Peyote Religion or of the NAC. Id.
Consequently, there are both Indian and non-Indian members within the
NAC and a classification scheme making a distinction based on NAC
membership will necessarily create racial distinctions. Non-Indians within
the NAC will be protected; non-Indians outside the NAC will not. People
similarly situated (non-Indian), are not treated similarly under this regulation.
As Peyote Way itself admits, equal protection requires similar treatment.
Peyote Way, 922 F.2d at 1214.
B. The AIRFA Amendments Violate the Due Process and Equal Protection
Guarantiesof the Fifth Amendment
The Due Process Clause's equal protection component mandates similar
treatment under the law for those similarly situated. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497 (1954).' The AIRFA Amendments fail to accomplish this
requirement.
The Peyote religion has existed for centuries; the corporate form of the
religion is the NAC which was established in Oklahoma in 1918. Boyll, 774
F. Supp. at 1336.' The cornerstone of the Peyote religion is the peyote
ceremony. When arrested, this is the ritual Gonzalez was conducting in his
capacity as a high priest of that religion. Gonzalez is a member of the
Peyote religion just as are the members of the NAC.
The AIRFA Amendments only exempt "Indians" from criminal
prosecution for the possession of peyote. As defined by those Amendments,
"Indians" include only those people "recognized as eligible for ... special
programs and services ... because of their status as Indians." 42 U.S.C. §
1996(3)(c)(2) (1994). This definition creates racial criteria; one must be an

24. Holding that since the NAC limits its own membership to people of at least 25% Native
American blood, the federal regulation limited to members of that Church creates political rather
than racial classifications. Peyote Way, 922 F.2d at 1216.
25. Holding that the segregation of children in public schools requires a proper government
objective to justify itself. Bolling, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). Peyote Way similarly required such an
objective. Peyote Way, 922 F.2d at 1219.
26. At that time, the Peyote Religion leaders reasoned that an incorporated Church would
provide greater protection from attempts to suppress the religious use of Peyote. Boyll, 774 F.
Supp. at 1336.
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Indian by blood to qualify. Any attempt to restrict religious liberties along
racial lines violates the equal protection clause. Boyll, 774 F. Supp. at
1340.' Furthermore, race conscious federal programs that impose "undue
burdens on non-minorities" violate the equal protection clause. Metro
Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).' The AIRFA Amendments
create this undue burden. Gonzalez, although similarly situated in terms of
religion with Indians, does not qualify for the AIRFA exemption because he
does not fit its racial criteria. This creates an undue burden on Gonzalez who
as a member of the Peyote religion can not, under the law, practice peyotism
because he is not Indian. The effect of the AIRFA Amendments is to
regulate the Peyote religion on the basis of race and to impose an undue
burden on non-minorities. This violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Opposing counsel will contend that the classification scheme in the
AIRFA Amendments makes distinctions along political rather than racial
lines. This argument is false just as the political classification made pursuant
to Peyote Way above is false. Studies have demonstrated that for "[a] variety
of circumstances .... many contemporary Indian tribes ...

remain federal

unrecognized." Paschal, supra, at 213. Therefore, there are Indians both
within and without the protections provided by the AIRFA Amendments.
Those included within the protections can practice peyotism; those without
can not. Similarly situated people are not receiving similar treatment. For
these reasons, the AIRFA Amendments violate the Equal Protection Clause.
V. Appellant Gonzalez Is Eligible for the Peyote Exemption of the AIRFA
Amendments Because He Falls Within Its Definition of "Indian"
Practicingan "IndianReligion"
Although opposing counsel will contend that the AIRFA Amendments
only apply to Indians who are members of federally "acknowledged" tribes,
this contention is misleading. The AIRFA Amendments apply to "Indians"
practicing "Indian religion." Gonzalez fits this criteria and qualifies for its
peyote exemption. The AIRFA Amendments specifically include as "Indians"
all members of tribes that are "recognized" by the federal government. 42
U.S.C. § 1996(3)(c). For the purposes of the AIRFA Amendments,
"acknowledged" and "recognized" are two distinct terms. The former is a
much more restrictive term that is limited pursuant to the acknowledgment
requirements of 25 C.F.R. § 83.7; the latter is a more inclusive term that
includes members of "any tribe, band, nation, pueblo, or other organized
group or community of Indians." 42 U.S.C. § 1996(3)(c). A definition of

27. Holding that permitting Indians' nondrug use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies
of the NAC, but prohibiting such use by non-Indian members, would violate the equal protection
clause. Boyll, 774 F. Supp at 1340.
28. Holding that FCC policies fostering minority ownership of radio and television stations
can not unduly burden non-minority owners. Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
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"Indian group" is found in the C.F.R. regulations. This definition includes
"any Indian ... aggregation within the continental United States that the
Secretaiy of the Interior does not acknowledge to be an Indian tribe." 25
C.F.R. § 83.1. Considering these definitions together, the LaPaz religion
which is not "acknowledged" as an "Indian tribe," must consequently be
"recognized" as an "Indian group" and therefore is within the AIRFA
Amendments. Gonzalez, as a member of this group, must receive the AIRFA
peyote exemption.
The legislative history surrounding the passage of the AIRFA
Amendments and the consideration of other legislation regarding Native
American cultures further supports this inclusive interpretation of "Indians."
Senate debate recognized that "the federal government's discrimination
against Native American traditional cultural and religious practices was
exercised against individuals and did not follow a line defined by the
federally recognized tribal status; and that protection afforded to the
traditional cultural and religious practices of native peoples . . . must be
extended within a cultural context." S. Rep. No. 411, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1994). Using this reasoning, Congress emphasized that the legislation
should, "extend to many individuals and groups who are not members of
federally recognized Indian tribes." S. Rep. No. 411. Clearly, it was the
intent of Congress in passing the AIRFA Amendments to include in the
definition of "Indian" as broad a range of Native Americans as possible.
Gonzalez, recognized by the LaPaz religion as a high priest, is most certainly
an "Indian" by that tribes definition and must fit within the broad AIRFA
definition. Furthermore, the LaPaz religion is a form of the Peyote Religion
which is itself an "Indian religion." According to legislative history, these
two factors qualify him as an "Indian" practicing "Indian religion" for the
purposes of the 1994 AIRFA Amendments.
VI. Conclusion
For all the reasons set forth above, the Appellants request that this Court
reverse the decisions of the courts below, by acknowledging the LaPaz Tribe
and vacating the conviction of Roberto Ernesto Gonzalez.
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